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This research explores the critical study of language and thought. It is a response to 
Wittgenstein and Fodor who believe in priority, superiority, and individuality of language and 
thought. In this paper, we can resolve this language and thought dichotomy to discuss the concept 
of priority issue. We shall argue that language and thought are modular concepts inside mind and 
there are also other modules present in our mind. This paper determines the role of language and 
thought and their priority in mind. Furthermore, this article shows inconsistency in priority, 
superiority and individuality. It also explores the role of quantification theory which discusses 
about the structure of thought and language, as well as about the model logic theory which 
discusses about the semantic part of language and thought. I shall also argue language and thought 
priority in Wittgenstein’s and Fodor’s thesis. 
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Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is that language and thought are intimately related to each other 
and their intimacy has led to priority of one over the other. Analytical tradition asserts less stress 
on the communicative part of language and thought, and more stress on structure, function, and 
abduction. Language and Thought are the concepts that have their individual nature in the domain 
of linguistics and logic. However, in this paper, I will consider only the philosophical nature of 
language and thought which would be further described on the basis of analytical methodology. 
 







Language is not only meant to be spoken, written and communicated but it has universal, symbolic, 
natural, modular and implicative significance. Same is the case with the thought which has not 
only the nature of expression of languages and their evaluation but which is also predicative, 
modular, arithmetic, sentential and formal. In analytical philosophy, language and thought are 
clarified in the structure of syntax, semantics, quantifiers and modal operators. The idea of 
language and thought are instrumental and technical concepts. Modern philosophy brought a 
revolution in the subject of philosophy through linguistic turn which was misunderstood for the 
spirituality of thought. Philosophers during ancient Greek and Medieval period assumed that 
thoughts are those mental things which interpret perceptions. According to Frege, Thoughts are 
abstract which do not depend on mind like the number and sets. Descartes defined thought as the 
attribute of mind which is the metaphor of other conscious processes like doubting, affirming, 
denying, willing, imagining and reasoning (Rorty, 1979, p. 47). 
There are two groups in an analytical tradition, one is the group of philosophers that 
consider language as prior to the thought, Wittgenstein, Chomsky, Quine and Sellars are the 
exponents of this view. While, other group of philosophers believe that thought is prior to 
language.  Fodor and Piaget are the exponents of this view. 
Wittgenstein regarding thought said: 
If one says that thought is a mental activity one thinks of the mind as a cloudy gaseous 
medium in which many things can happen which cannot occur in a different sphere, and from 
which many things can be expected that are otherwise not possible; the process of thinking in 
human mind and the process of digestion. Mental processes can be true or false, and non- mental 
cannot be as such. What kind of things are mental processes? If the metal process or thought 
process is then it is known through its description (Wittgenstein L. , Philosophical Grammar, 
1974). 
According to Fodor, thinking is information processing within ‘the language of thought’. 
Mind is assumed as a computer, which directs action with the aid of internal representations of the 
world. Language of thought is innate. This language is an inner language which is different from 
English, Sanskrit, Persian, Arabic, Hebrew and Spanish. Scientists and philosophers do not know 
what kind of language it is. Some say that it is symbolic; some say it is algebraic, mathematical, 
universal, etc. Fodor claims that thinking is performing computational operations on mental 
representations. These inner representations form a system with many of the basic properties of a 
language, so the system can be called ‘the language of thought’ (Fodor 1975). 
However, many cognitive scientists hold that language processing cannot be understood 
simply in terms of aspects of memory, reasoning and other cognitive processes that help us make 
sense of the world. They argue that language must rely on a relatively autonomous set of abilities, 
each having its own knowledge base and the whole affair functioning, to a large extent, 
independently of other cognitive processes (Fodor, 1983; Chomsky, 1986). 
 
 







Language and Thought 
According to Gilbert Harman in his work Language, thought and communication, language 
is used primarily in thought, the majority of thinking is carried out in natural language. Jean Piaget 
wrote in his work the language and thought of the child that the function of language is not only 
communicating thought but more than that.  According to Martin Davis, it is useful to distinguish 
between three kinds of priority questions: ontological, epistemological and analytical, “to say that 
thought enjoys ontological supremacy over language is to say that language is ontologically 
dependent on thought while thought is not  dependent on language  i.e., there cannot be language 
without thought; but there can be thought without language. Similarly, it is described for 
epistemological and analytical. Donald Davidson rejects the thesis of priority of thought over 
language and vice versa. He said that there cannot be thought without language. In order to have 
thoughts especially propositional attitudes, a creature must be a member of language community 
and an interpreter of the speech of others. 
We can distinguish between two types of cognitive modularity which since the early 1980s, 
has become prominent in linguistics and cognitive science in at least two ways. First, the American 
philosopher Jerry Fodor has been arguing that human mind is itself modular, that is, it consists of 
a number of specialized subcomponents for handling different tasks, such as speaking and seeing. 
Second, the American linguist Noam Chomsky has been arguing that the human language faculty 
is modular, that is, it must consist of a fairly large number of semi-autonomous units, each of 
which responsible for certain particular aspects of our linguistic competence. 
Fodor assumed that language of thought is innate and universal. He further believed that 
all languages share the common structure at some abstract level. There are many versions of the 
language that affect thought claim. One version which is most often associated with Whorf (1956) 
and Sapir (1921), is that differences between languages, such as between English and Urdu, lead 
to differences in thoughts. Another version, sometimes attributed to Vygostsky (1962) is that 
cognition is shaped by properties that all languages share. From this second perspective, the 
interesting contrast isn’t between speakers of English and speakers of Urdu, it is between speakers 
of any language versus those people or animals who have no language at all. 
According to Fodor, languages directly encode the categories we think in, and moreover 
that these constitute an innate and universal ‘language of thought’ or mentalese. As Pinker (1994, 
p.82) put it “knowing a language, then, is “knowing how to translate mentalese into stings of words 
and vice versa. People without a language would still have mentalese, and babies and many non-
human animals presumably have simpler dialects”. 
The language is a universal medium is the foundation of the perception of Wittgenstein’s 
semantic framework. The explanation and appreciation of the semantics of Wittgenstein is possible 
only when this character is put in mind. Language is a system of symbols which represent the 
world as well as constitutes the logical criterion of making the symbol system coherent and 
consistent. Language represents everything related to the world and ourselves within itself. Even 
 







our understanding of language is expressed in language without any requirement of meta-language.  
Frege and Wittgenstein conscious us that no meta-language is involved in expression and language 
has limits in its representation power. Wittgenstein, in order to counter the possibility that grammar 
can be independent of our language and holds that language contains its syntactics and semantics 
i.e. it contains its grammar without presupposing and independent medium to express the rules of 
grammar. No language is possible if it does not contain its grammar. So, Frege’s theory of logical 
and grammar is the background of Wittgenstein’s  Tractatus that develops  representational 
framework for understanding language and the world. According to Wittgenstein, the structure of 
the world is the same as the structure of language and this can be unfolded by the logical structure 
of the meaning. Thus, the structure of the meaning becomes the main concern as it provides key 
to the structure of language and the world. Wittgenstein attempted to bring out the essence of 
language and the world in his transcendental conception of logic.   
In the 1980s, however, Jerry Fodor revived the idea of the modularity of mind, although 
without the notion of precise physical localizability. Drawing from Noam Chomsky's idea of the 
language acquisition device and other work in linguistics as well as from the philosophy of mind 
and the implications of optical illusions, he became one of its most articulate proponents with the 
1983 publication of Modularity of Mind. According to Fodor, a module falls somewhere between 
the behaviorist and cognitivist views of lower-level processes.  Behaviorists tried to replace the 
mind with reflexes which Fodor describes as encapsulated (cognitively impenetrable or unaffected 
by other cognitive domains) and non-inferential (straight pathways with no information added). 
Low level processes are unlike reflexes in that they are inferential. This can be demonstrated by 
poverty of the stimulus arguments in which the proximate stimulus, that which is initially received 
by the brain (such as the 2D image received by the retina), cannot account for the resulting output 
(for example, our 3D perception of the world), thus necessitating some form of computation.  
In contrast, cognitivists saw lower level processes as continuous with higher level 
processes, being inferential and cognitively penetrable (influenced by other cognitive domains, 
such as beliefs). The latter has been shown to be untrue in some cases, such as with many visual 
illusions, which can persist despite a person‘s awareness of their existence. This is taken to indicate 
that other domains, including one‘s beliefs, cannot influence such processes.  
For Fodor, in line with Chomsky‘s ideas, innateness is also a notion frequently associated 
with modularity drawing from his idea of LAD (Ingram, 2007). But whereas Chomsky locates 
modularity firmly within language ability, Fodor locates it in the mechanisms that support 
language processing. Fodor believes that the language faculty is modular in that the processing of 
linguistic input is not affected by higher cognitive domains or by other input systems; that is each 
module is autonomous from other modules. The language module, as cited in Carroll (2001), - 
processes only linguistic representations; in other words, the system encoding language is 
independent of the system used for encoding thought‖ (p. 251). Modules may have very limited 
access to other modules Fodor, according to Field (2004), views the mind as composed of a set of 
 







central modules which handle general operations such as attention and these central systems are 
supported by input modules which act autonomously and process sensory information such as 
language. The input systems are modular and, according to Wodak and Chilton (2005), have the 
following characteristics:  
 
Fodor, according to Perkins (2007), argues that various aspects of human cognition may 
be modules. In contrast to Chomsky‘s ideas who claim that the central system is itself constructed 
and is composed of a variety of modules, moreover, in contrast to Chomsky‘s belief that the central 
system is structured and tend to investigation, Fodor considers the central system to be 
unstructured and complicated to investigate. Fodor makes connections between his concept of 
modularity and that of Darwinian or computational modularity which are determined by genetic 
factors (Carruthers & Chamberlin, 2000). According to Crystal (2008), the main difference 
between Chomsky‘s and Fodor‘s concept of language modularity is that in Fodor‘s modularity, 
mind is modular in a sense that it consists of different systems (modules), each with its own 
distinctive properties; whereas, in Chomsky‘s modularity, the language system is itself modular in 
a sense that it consists of a number of different subsystems which interact in different ways. 
Fodor’s view is that language is but an input and output module to central cognition 
(thought perhaps drawing on a centrally stored lexicon and database), not implicated in the central 
processes of thinking and reasoning themselves. These latter processes are held to involve sentence 
like structures, to be sure, but these are not sentences of any natural language, but rather of an 
innate, universal, symbolic system, which Fodor called mentalese. 
According to analytical concept of language and thought; thought cannot be possible 
without language. Fodor described that ‘anything that is red is colored’ is necessarily true because 
it is true in all possible worlds. Taken in this conceptual sense then, the claim that thought 
necessary involves language can be true only if the concept of language is implicated in the concept 
of thought. 
Language processing depends upon the autonomous capacities of the mind. It has its own 
field, its knowledge base and functions. Language faculty works independently of other cognitive 
processes (Groome, 1999, p. 131). Fodor assumed that linguistic rules are not necessary for 
psychological processes. These rules are not real as they are not blueprints of cognitive processes 
(Groome, 1999, p. 140). We think about things, but how do these things enter into our thoughts? 
How do we perform the act of thinking? The language is itself the vertical component of thought. 
Thinking is an incorporeal process. Speech with and without thought is compared with the playing 
of a piece of music with and without thought. William James said that thought is possible without 
speech. Chomsky argues that children are exceptional learners of language because human mind 
is biased. What mind would like to put as the first word in input is really a controversial issue. 
Why children like nouns and objects than verbs and phrases. While Fodor recognizes that there is 
no partiality in thought. Thought is universal to every child. 
 







Philosophers assumed that most of the knowledge about language and thought is 
mysterious. They questioned that in the evolution of languages and thoughts which one of them 
evolved first in the world. Philosophers have many doubts and questions regarding language and 
thought i.e. how language evolved in the world. Who used the first word in language and what was 
that word? What interprets language inside the mind? Is language innate or acquired, is there a 
Module for language and thought in the mind or is it non-modular? How thoughts arise in the 
mind? What analyzes, synthesize and assembles them? Are thoughts innate to the mind or they 
depend on something else? What is the role of perception, sensation, images and concepts in the 
domain of thought? What is relationship between the module of thought and the module of 
language? Can a human being with thoughts survive, communicate and evolve without language 
and it’s vice versa. Is there really a supremacy of one over other or there is no supremacy at all? 
Are language and thought simultaneously created? Do humans have the capacity to understand 
and speak with animals and birds? 
According to Fodor ‘we think in language but we can’t think in language in which we 
speak, the language of the thought is different from the language in which we communicate our 
ideas. The language of thought is not a natural language (preti, 2001).  Cartesians also take 
language to be an expression of thought and believe that thought is essentially creative; they claim 
that there is a ‘creative aspect of language use’. Wittgenstein has often taken to arguing that 
thought is impossible unless certain specified relations hold between the individual and society. 
Likewise he assumes that thought is normative (Hawthorne, 1994). 
Frege defined thoughts as ‘thoughts have denotational content and constitute the sole focus 
of semantic enquiry. (Ronnie Cann, 2010). For Fodor, Human Mind is a system for manipulating 
symbols according to syntactic rules which determine the recursive complexity of thoughts so 
called ‘language of thought’ (Fodor 1975, 1983). 
 
According to Wittgenstein; language can be known with its use. Epistemology exercises a 
significant role in the domain of language. How we know language? Is the knowledge of language 
innate or acquired? Are linguistic items sense data? To what extent is the knowledge of language 
valid? Is knowledge of the language certain? How Wittgenstein resolved the epistemic problem of 
language. 
Epistemology and language are intimately related in the analytical tradition of 
Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein said that there is a correspondence between language and reality. The 
language manifests reality in propositional form. He further said that language pictures the reality. 
Knowing or understanding language is to know the world. Language hypothesis and logic are 
inseparable. Wittgenstein assumes that to understand a language is to take in a symbolism as a 
whole (Wittgenstein L., Philosophical Grammar, 1974). 
Wittgenstein said that ‘to understand a structure is much more akin to understand a theme 
in a music than one may think’. Wittgenstein further argued that understanding is a mental process 
 







or hypothetical (logical) process. Understanding is not the behavioral process but it is mental state 
in which human behavior is the sign (Wittgenstein L., Philosophical Grammar, 1974). 
According to Wittgenstein, “All philosophy is a critique of language” (Wittgenstein, 2001). 
It was Russell who performed the service of showing that the apparent logical form of a proposition 
need not be its real one. Wittgenstein too is of the opinion that the grammatical form of a sentence 
in natural language can differ from its real logical form. And if the two are not carefully 
distinguished from each other, all kinds of pseudo-problems can arise, and all kinds of pseudo-
theories may be used to try to solve them. It was for this reason that   
the task of philosophy as a therapeutic one: the aim of philosophical analysis was a logical 
clarification of our thoughts. 
Linguistic philosophy takes the view that philosophical problems are problems which may 
be solved or shown as no problem at all either by reforming the language, or by understanding 
more about the language we presently use. According to this position the logical structure of our 
thought is concealed or misrepresented in language. Peculiarities of linguistic form such as 
analogies, metaphors and similes may misrepresent or conceal the logical structure. Once we 
appreciate this possibility and once we make the meaning of our words clear and the way they are 
combined in language explicit, most of the questions would be found as non-questions. Most of 
the unsolved problems are due to confusions in the way the language is used, the way questions 
are asked. The problems must be considered as linguistic confusions which can be cleared up. This 
is so because language does not consist only of rules of words, their derivation and use, and their 
combination according to syntactic constraints but also an enormous number of conventions not 
expressly formulated but always presupposed in understanding everyday language. Formulating 
and bringing these tacit conventions to consciousness form the process of the clarification of ideas 
from the basis upon which new ideas are brought out. To clarify and simplify the vague meaning 
of statements we must analyze the meanings of words and the logical relations between them in 
language. Such an enquiry is pursued to solve many problems related to determinism, skepticism 
and causation. 
Linguistic philosophical approach is important for the study of language use in science 
because it emphasizes, focus’s and is based upon the pivotal role of language in the development, 
analysis, categorization and so on of knowledge. It is important because it insists upon looking at 
sentences and their structures as used for the expression of ideas.   
Ordinary language is ambiguous and this ambiguity can be removed only by interpretation. 
He gave the example of a boy in a picture walking up a hill. This picture likely represents the other 
way that the boy is sliding down the hill. If one tries to remove the ambiguity by attaching an arrow 
pointing towards uphill. The arrow signifies the direction in which the man is going rather than 
the direction from which he is coming (Lowe, 2000). 
How might the process of parsing work? Early psycholinguistic research (e.g. Sachs, 1967; 
Slobin, 1966) had shown that we do not use processes that mirror linguistic rules when interpreting 
 







sentences. Fodor et al. (1974) argued that although linguistic rule systems were not blueprints for 
psychological processing (i.e. were not ‘psychologically real’), the end-product of parsing was a 
syntactic representation and this representation was the deep structure of the sentence as described 
by Chomsky (1965). They proposed that to recover the syntactic structure of sentences, rather than 
following systematic rules, we use a number of heuristic strategies, essentially rules of thumb, 
which generally allow us to arrive at the appropriate structure but are not foolproof and may 
sometimes fail and lead us astray. 
 
Conclusion 
Language and thought are contemporary issues which nowadays have become a hot debate 
of philosophers and other thinkers. Since most of the theories have proved a lot about it but very 
much is unknown also. However, we are unknown about the origin of language and thought 
module in mind and also the first word used. Wittgenstein claimed that proposition expresses 
language of reality and Fodor maintained thought has its own language. This study is the critique 
of Wittgenstein and Jerry Fodor and it implies that modules of language and thought are related 
with respect to things. There exists one more module which is known as module of relation. 
Nevertheless, it shows the form and meaning of language and thought with the help of 
quantification theory and model logic theory. In this study we are using; universal, existential 
quantifiers to determine the formal aspect of language and thought as well as we can use model 
operators which determine the meaning and aspects of language and thought. 
Thought and language are universal. There is no priority of one over the other but these 
could be necessarily relative and created for one another. These modules are created in mind by 
some third dimensional force which is a type of consciousness. It seems to me that it is some kind 
of medium which makes thought and language possible. However, Language and thought are 
independent and relative. This study is based on deductive research. As concept of time and space 
are related, so are the language and thought. Moreover, we cannot believe on the priority of time 
over space and it’s vice versa. In this study, quantification logic and model logic play an important 
role to situate the issue of universality, existentiality and modality of thought and language. Thus, 
it seems to me that language and thought are different modules of mind among the others. It has 
been concluded that all languages have a common logical form and there is no priority of language 
over thought and its vice versa. Language and thought are simultaneously created and evolved. 
However, model operators show the semantic part of language and thought and Quantifier 
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